TOO THIN ON TOP: THE UNDER-RESOURCING OF HEADQUARTERS IN FORCE DESIGN
The U.S. military is undergoing one of the most extensive transformations in its history, and is simultaneously fighting a global war in multiple theaters. For the Army, this is most certainly the biggest conceptual change since the development of the "New Look" Pentomic Division of the 1950s. This is all occurring while it is simultaneously deployed in two separate combat operations fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While it is incredibly difficult to accomplish either task individually, the current environment makes it significantly so; requiring leaders to keep focused on the war and at the same time evaluating the transformation plans with a clear head and discerning eye while attempting to foresee future changes to warfare and potential enemy capabilities. Furthermore, transformation of any organization is a complicated process and is especially difficult in an organization that is inherently conservative in its nature, as is the U.S. Army.
While the U.S. Army has had many structural changes in its history, one constant that pervades the forces the Army designs institutionally is that the operational warfighting headquarters are inherently understaffed to accomplish the missions to which they are assigned. Many factors such as personnel strength, budgetary considerations, and technology influence Army structural design, but primary among these many factors in designing new forces should be warfighting capabilities. However, too often personnel and budgetary considerations outweigh those critical warfighting headquarters' capabilities in building unit and force designs. This is primarily due to a lack of understanding of what warfighting headquarters do by those driving the design changes.
Historically the Army, the War Department, and subsequently its successor the Department of Defense have regularly shortchanged the headquarters elements when designing unit structure. They consequently have often paid a price in effectiveness and capabilities during peace and at the initiation of conflict, and then had to scramble to augment those headquarters with unresourced assets in war. The result has been throughout the historical record, instead of going to war with capable, trained teams that have working relationships and established staff processes, the U.S. military has had to fight wars through adhoc headquarters, cobbled together with borrowed or newly acquired equipment and untrained augmentees. Now in the current transformation process under Task Force Modularity at
Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters (TRADOC) and the Combined Arms Doctrine Division (CADD) at the Combined Arms Center (CAC), the recent design of the Unit of Employment x (UEx) as the new divisions and corps, and Unit of Employment y (UEy) as the numbered armies, the Army is continuing to follow this model of inadequacy in headquarters design.
Historically, the Army has had difficulty changing. There was significant resistance and in the first half of the twentieth century to the establishment of the Army Air Corps, the mechanization of the Army, the "New Look" concepts of the 1950's with the establishment of the Pentomic Divisions, and the development of the Air Assault division in the 1960's. In each case, the Army was changing due to technological and operational advances in warfare and therefore, adapting structure and organization to meet the requirements of that emerging technology. The new realities resulting from these changes in technology and doctrine are reflected in the thinking of military theorist Martin Van Crevald, who proposed in his book Command in War that the complexity of modern war and the systems we employ require even larger and more capable staffs in order to be effective. While many of his proposals are in line with the concepts of modularity which we are employing in the current transformation process, the other side of the issue is that these deployable and modular units are very technologically and information dependent; and therefore either require more robust headquarters or the creation of a way to gain efficiencies in command and control (C2) and information management. 1 In the U.S.
Army, we have a tradition or rather a habit of cutting headquarters elements to gain efficiency, but not manning and equipping elements adequately for their required capabilities.
Unfortunately, the Army is not changing this precedent as it further transforms.
Origins of U.S. Army Staffs, Divisions and Corps
The history of development of headquarters and staffs in the U.S. Army is voluminous. 2 However, Washington himself acted personally as the chief engineer and the head of intelligence. 3 The concept of a large permanent staff serving a commander to perform planning and synchronization was virtually unknown.
The Army itself was primarily structured along regimental and brigade lines, and line staffs were often ad-hoc structures that most of the Continental Army simply made up as needed, depending upon existing militia organization or what the officers had observed from the British;
No staff officers were included in the militia organization of any colony, nor were any considered necessary. Even in an eighteenth century professional army, staff officers existed only in time of war. Their omission in America from the militia organization did not imply that its officers were unaware of the positions occupied by staff officers in European armies. Their knowledge of staff organization, however, came largely from reading. Some colonists serving in the French and Indian War had observed British staff operations. 4 Consequently, from the very beginning there was no strong tradition for maintaining a staff system for the U.S. Army to conduct planning and coordination for operations in peace or war.
It would take until 1903 before the Army established a standard staff structure tied to professional military education for its officers.
In relation to armies, the term division has had different meanings throughout time, dependent on history and geography. While French and British armies used combined arms divisions as maneuver elements throughout the Napoleonic wars, it was not until the American Civil War that the corps and division both became critical organizational and battlefield tools in the command of both the Union and Confederate Army. 5 The influence of Napoleonic warfare was pervasive in the U.S. Army, and so both sides adopted some of its structure and formations. The Union Army division was made up of usually three brigades and approximately 4000 to 6000 men, with a corps consisting of two or more divisions. The Confederate structure was approximately twice the size of Union formations, but for both armies, in all major battles this new structure became the primary means of employment of forces.
In the Ante-bellum period and at the beginning of the Civil War, the American army had an extensive staff system with many officers having served on staffs at small frontier postings, but very few had experience handling large, complex forces which was therefore a tremendous shortcoming. For the commanders in the field, the staff was a more ad-hoc and austere group of men who served commanders primarily on issues of administration and logistics, with some planning. These staffs generally consisted of a small personal retinue of aides, much like that of and knew how to use them. Staff procedure and policies for the AEF were developed on the job, and along with this was the task of designing armies and corps. There was no U.S.
experience for these organizations and they were designed based solely on the judgment of Pershing and the AEF staff. This caused some growing pains, as originally U.S. planners wanted each corps to be very large with six organic divisions assigned. However, they soon abandoned this concept as unworkable in favor of the French system where a corps consisted of a headquarters element, technical units, and artillery, and divisions were assigned as available or as needed for missions.
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For tactical fighting headquarters in this new war, Pershing had the example of the U.S.
division design, as well as British and French divisional designs which were much more robust.
Ultimately he concluded that the U.S. needed a new design that was capable of prolonged combat, could seize and hold ground and also continue to advance. The result of this thinking was the 29,000 man "square division". Even this robust organization was inadequately structured for command and control, synchronization of operations, and logistics support. The board also believed that the division headquarters and its headquarters company had grown too large. To reduce the size of the headquarters company, its strength was cut almost in half by eliminating the defense platoon and some vehicles, drivers, and orderlies. The band assumed the mission of protecting the divisional headquarters as an additional duty. Divisional staff sections remained the same, but the board cut some assistant staff officers and enlisted men. Total reductions in the division represented a 13.5 percent decrease in all ranks and 23 percent in vehicles.
14 But the proposed new structure met challenges from commanders in the field. At
Marshall's direction, McNair and other members of the board traveled to the combat zone where corps and division commanders rejected the new designs as unacceptable, cutting division strength below minimum levels that they thought could perform effectively in combat. As a result McNair had to go back and re-design a compromise solution that satisfied the field commanders and was almost identical to the original design. 15 There were a few more changes in armored division structure in 1942 and 1943, but the divisions fought throughout both theaters of WW II for the remainder of the war without any more major re-designs.
Much less attention was paid to the formal design of corps headquarters than was focused on division structure. While the corps was the primary headquarters for employing combat elements, controlling any number of divisions depending upon the situation, there was no real base design for a corps. 16 Their composition varied constantly with army commanders Eisenhower directed Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith to develop the headquarters requirements, and fortunately Smith had the foresight to see the breadth of requirements for the organization. He understood that an Allied headquarters that was going to control all field operations would require a large, expanded staff and that the existing headquarters was inadequate. 18 Under Smith's direction the SHAEF staff began to gather personnel, integrating British and U.S. officers, CASSOC and AFHQ personnel, as well in seeking out more talented officers throughout the theater. However, in doing so SHAEF drained many subordinate headquarters to the point that those commanders expressed concern that they would become unable to continue operations. The building of SHAEF was the reaction to an evolving requirement in war, resulting in creating an ad hoc headquarters, stripping subordinate organizations to create it, and integrating the different policies and procedures of CASSOC and AFHQ. It was fortuitous for the Allies that Bedell Smith had the foresight to see the need for an expanded staff to control the vast and expansive requirements to accomplish the mission, and took the required actions.
The example of the creation of SHAEF under Eisenhower is a historical milestone in headquarters development, but most importantly a case where an adequate headquarters was built not by bureaucrats in Washington, but rather by the leaders in the field who understood the requirements. The result of this re-design was the Pentomic Division, built around these new concepts that the ground forces were intended to both survive a nuclear attack and also successfully employ tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The division headquarters was consolidated in to a headquarters battalion of 670 in an infantry division and 515 in an armored division.
Overall the infantry division strength lost 4000 personnel, with five battle groups which were smaller than regiments but larger than battalions making up the combat force in place of the traditional three infantry or armor regiments. 22 Like many transformation experiences, the Pentomic Division was met with skepticism and resistance. However, the new design was adopted despite those reservations and the fact that the experimentation had indicated organizational inadequacies in the unit. General Maxwell
Taylor drove much of the change, basing the concepts on the idea that manpower limitations and use of nuclear weapons by both sides would demand much smaller tactical forces. In retrospect, critics argue that this reliance on nuclear weapons caused the Army by the mid1950s to lose its strategic direction and resulted in Army leaders seeking relevance with rocket and missile systems, effectively competing with the Air Force. 23 Clearly, the Army was predominantly concerned about relevance in the new world of nuclear warfare, and so had developed the concepts for the Pentomic Division to ensure a continued place at the table. However, CSA Matthew Ridgeway was concerned that the U.S.
had traded off its capability to fight a conventional war.
The Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgway, upon his retirement in June 1955, expressed his doubts cogently. As Soviet nuclear strength grew, General Ridgway maintained, a situation of nuclear parity would come into being, where neither side would have an advantage… If this should happen, the American military forces then in being would not be strong enough to meet the lesser Soviet challenge. General Ridgway put the case bluntly: "The present United States preoccupation with preparations for general war has limited the military means available for cold war to those which are essentially by-products or leftovers from the means available for general war."
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General Ridgeway's concerns were well founded and were wise counsel relevant not just for the Cold War, but even for today. In any force design, the military must be capable of carrying out the full spectrum of operations in war, against the worst case scenario with multiple adversaries. The Pentomic Division designs fell short of that requirement. Fortunately, the Pentomic design's inadequacies and shortcomings were evident to most senior leaders. By 1963 the Army concluded that the Pentomic Division had insufficient combat power to conduct ground combat in anything less than a nuclear environment. Amazingly and almost inexplicably, it also had concluded at the time that the division command and control structure was too large and complex. However, in fact the unit staffs, …lost all administrative functions except those needed to maintain unit efficiency. Personnel for administration, mess, and maintenance functions were concentrated in battalion headquarters companies throughout. All staffs were minimal; the divisional G-1 and G-4 functions were reduced to policy, planning, and coordinating activities. Routine administrative and logistical matters were moved to the support command. Infantry divisions, similar to armored divisions, were to use task force organizations as situations required. school, and from corps and division commanders and staffs on these designs. In the end, the new designs reduced the heavy division organic combat power and gave it strength of 17,000, while the light division was a very austere, yet mobile organization of 10,800. Critics of the AOE designs argued that the light division was too light to fight and too heavy to run, as it lacked tactical mobility once deployed. Even with reduced combat power, the heavy armored and mechanized infantry division was generally accepted because under the operational construct with a corps as the primary employment headquarters, the corps commander had sufficient combat power to be an effective operational-level force to compensate for those design issues.
However, the support units were deemed insufficient by many critics, and so the Army was again taking risk in support elements of the division in an effort at efficiency, at the expense of effectiveness.
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Despite its shortcomings, this AOE division structure was the force with which the U.S. The division conceptually was to cover a 350 x 350 kilometer battlespace, a significant increase for division and a major C2 challenge. 34 Lieutenant Colonel Fred Svedarsky was the CADD lead for the UEx working group and his direction to the group was to design a headquarters based on capabilities within size restrictions close to current division headquarters. Immediately, the question was asked, "Aren't we doing this backward? Shouldn't we design a headquarters that meets the capabilities and requirements, and then review it for resources, and if too large, examine where to cut rather than telling us to design to a certain capability, yet imposing limitations?" The answer was that yes, that would be the preferred method in a perfect circumstance, but that the restrictions were established and the design had to remain within those parameters. The final UEx Design 7.2, approved by the CSA is significantly different in design, but the capabilities requirements are the same, and yet the size much smaller. The UEx was cut to 953 personnel, the tactical command posts lost twenty-one, the Main CP gained thirty-nine, and the band was removed to create a separate organization not counted against the headquarters' size. Ultimately, this is a shell game with the gains predominately in drivers and operators to reverse 6.0 cuts, but relieving some planners and operations officers to perform primary duties from the diversion of operating computer systems. 39 With 953 personnel in final UEx Design for the new division, it is comparably larger and more robust than the 875 personnel for the AOE division, appearing that the headquarters is more capable to deal with increased complexity and responsibility. However, this is for a vastly expanded battlespace and a significant increase of responsibility for the division. While reorganized and augmented, the UEx divisional staff sections exist basically much as they did
before, yet the related support brigade staffs that supplemented those staff sections are not an integral part of the division. In modular units those support staffs now come only when deployed as part of a non-associated support brigade, which are consequently shared among several divisions. When considering the loss of the supporting brigades as an integral part of the division, the existing support staff in the UEx division structure in fact is significantly reduced and most likely inadequate, especially for extended, high-intensity operations. Additionally, under the UEx construct, the division staff will also be asked to combine the previous missions of corps and division staffs as we compress from three levels of division and above staff down to two levels of division and above staff. 40 In the end, we have combined echelons for efficiency, increased the staff's responsibilities, and will ask them to do more with less.
Unfortunately, it is clear that capabilities have not been the predominant considerations in our current transformation design work. The personnel and budgetary constraints have set limits on the organizations and taken precedence over capabilities and requirements. The
Army's design process for the UEx division construct and the support brigades has been guided by these constraints, and although challenged as a process, it has dominated the design of these headquarters. Additionally, in many cases sound, substantiated, and well developed arguments for change were dismissed out of hand because they did not fit pre-conceived concepts that underlay the transformation process. While some parochialism may be at play, the impression among several branches of the Army is that unreasonable constraints have hampered the development of a capable and viable organization. is problematic because it is a top-down vision that has given little consideration to the concerns of lower tiers of leaders in the organization. 43 Another aspect of the criticism of the process is that while there is clearly and justifiably a tendency to concentrate on combat forces at expense of headquarters, it may be a reasonable approach, but it is not a smart approach. Balance is required in formulating these transformed unit designs, with equal emphasis on combat power as well as the ability to command and control those elements. We also must design the staffs with a robust nature to take on the added responsibilities under the UEx divisional construct. When these issues were raised to the design team at the CADD and TRADOC, these concerns were dismissed. When raised to the TRADOC Commander by school commandants, they were again dismissed. The argument against these concerns centered on making the headquarters more agile and deployable, but in fact failed to consider requests for review based on the additional tasks and responsibilities under the compressed C2 designs. In fact, after a General Officer In-Progress Review (GOIPR) at Fort Leavenworth in early 2004, and after further CADD review, the staffs were cut even more in size and scope without any consultation of the proponents. With a decision making process so lacking in participation, the branches and proponents for the staff sections and support elements cannot see themselves as a part of a team whose views are considered during the decision process. In the near future, we will certainly find that our UEx staffs involved in combat operations will require significant augmentation just as our division and combatant command staffs have required over the past fifteen years since Operation Desert Storm. Rather than addressing the real capabilities and requirements for the UEx headquarters, we have once again ignored history and committed the error of placing the design requirements we really need in order to establish a viable combat headquarters in a distant second place to cost considerations. We must hope that that cost savings does not result in the cost of lives in future combat operations.
The Army leadership must also deal with the criticism and resistance to the changes occurring under the transformation process. When General Shinseki initiated transformation, both he and subsequently current CSA General Schoomaker looked ahead and enunciated a vision. The problem is these are top-down developed visions with very little input from the rest of the Army. While these actions did set a tone for realization that change was imperative, inevitable, and unavoidable, the leadership did not get buy-in and possibly can be accused of arbitrarily forcing changes to the very essence of the Army identity, and they consequently have met significant resistance. The nature of the Army is that the leaders set the vision and subordinates will comply, however, to gain consensus the Army leadership needs to conduct some form of the participative decision making process that the officer and non-commissioned officer corps perceive as truly considering valid concerns and criticisms of the new structure. 45 This needs to be done much as General Marshall did in sending General McNair to the combat zone in 1943, and not only listening but acting on combat commanders' criticism of a new divisional structure. Without overcoming the perception that transformation lacks leaders' input and puts budget priorities over capabilities, the Army will continue to have resistance, will not achieve buy-in of the current senior leaders of divisions and brigades, and will not get their commitment to the transformation vision.
In the final analysis, while personnel and budgetary concerns cannot be ignored, the DoD leadership must recognize that the military forces and warfare are not a business that can be tied to a cost driven bottom line of efficiency. Effectiveness of a force in war is paramount, and must always be the primary consideration over efficiency. Leaders at the highest levels must recognize that the force structure must be robust and capabilities driven, designed for the worst case scenario to always be able to fight and win the nation's wars.
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